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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
In an attempt to cover the errors of the court of appeals, Eggett distorts the record 
and obfuscates the case law. Eggett attempts now to alter the very essence of the case, 
from one seeking enforcement of an express contract provision for the book value of 
stock to one seeking damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. Eggett ignores the plain language of the Special Verdict, asserting for the first 
time that the jury actually awarded damages for breach of the implied covenant. (Resp. 
Br. 16.) Eggett even goes so far as to assert that the Special Verdict, signed by the jury 
foreman, is not the verdict at all. (Resp. Br. 36.) 
Despite Eggett's machinations, the appeal remains centered on the proper 
determination of the book value of his stock. The choices are (1) the audited or 
"Contract Book Value," to which Eggett agreed and which he requested in his resignation 
letter (Addendum to Pet. Br., hereafter "Add.," 39, 46, 85); (2) the "Jury Book Value," as 
derived from the jury's verdict (Add. 23); or (3) the "Judge's Book Value," as contrived 
by the district court and awarded in the Judgment (Add. 17). The two essential issues 
related to book value are first, whether Eggett can ignore the plain terms of the 
Shareholders' Agreement, increasing his book value based on notions of equity; and 
second, whether the district court may question jurors regarding their plain verdict in 
order to create ambiguity and supplant their verdict with his own. Eggett's lengthy and 
winding analysis of many other, immaterial subjects must not distract this Court from 
these two clear issues. 
REPLY TO EGGETT5 S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Eggett asks this Court to approve the judgment awarding him book value of 
$135, 671, when the Shareholders5 Agreement authorized only $27,540, and the Special 
Verdict awarded him only $49,520. The facts justify no such windfall. 
Eggett agreed, in the Shareholders' Agreement he drafted, that the stock book 
value of departing shareholders would be conclusively established by Wasatch's 
independently audited financial statement. (Add. 39, 46.) In his resignation letter, Eggett 
concedes, "I am required to sell my shares . . . for the audited Book Value as of June 30, 
1997." (Add. 85.) Eggett's complaint, filed September 9, 1997, seeks book value of only 
$80,000. (R. 4.) The complaint does not seek additional amounts for supposed unfair 
adjustments in the audited financial statement. In fact, the complaint makes no allegation 
that the Company's financial statement was prepared in bad faith. Eggett now asserts 
that he claimed a higher book value at trial because of the Company's unexpected 
profitability (Resp. Br. 5); however, the Company's audited book value was fixed as of 
June 30, 1997, regardless of subsequent growth, and regardless of Eggett's later 
disagreement with that audited book value. 
Eggett challenges the audited book value on the basis that the Company financial 
statement, including the adjustments to income, was prepared by Company financial 
officers, not by the independent auditor. (Resp. Br. 6.) However, as Eggett well knows, 
this is standard procedure; any company typically prepares its own financial statements 
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internally, and then submits those statements for audit by independent accountants. As 
set forth in the Ernst & Young report on Wasatch's audited statement: 
These financial statements are the responsibility of the Company's 
management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial 
statements based on our audits. 
We conducted our audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 
obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements arc free 
of material misstatement. . . . An audit also includes assessing the 
accounting principles used and significant estimates made by 
management.... 
In our opinion, the consolidated financial statements referred to above 
present fairly, in all material respects, the consolidated financial position of 
Wasatch Energy Corporation at June 30, 1997.. .in conformity with 
generally accepted accounting principles. [Add. 54, emp. added.] 
Accordingly, the independent auditors verified that all Company adjustments to income 
were appropriate. 
Eggett himself testified that, as Company president, he participated in preparation 
of Company financial statements, including making necessary adjustments to income, and 
used those statements as a "management tool" to direct the Company. (Tr. 886-89.) 
Moreover, Eggett conceded that Wasatch's audited statement was prepared "in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles," acknowledging that those 
"principles are not black and white, that they can be interpreted and that there is also a 
range of reasonable answers." {Id. 890-91, emp. added.) 
Eggett asserts that Wasatch purposely adjusted its income downward solely to 
reduce the book value of his stock. (Resp. Br. 6.) However, the adjustments were 
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actually contrary to the Company's interest because operating credit is more difficult to 
obtain with a statement showing less income. In fact, Wasatch actually opposed the 
degree of adjustments insisted upon by the independent auditor. Accordingly, the 
adjustments were made without regard to their impact on the value of Eggett's stock. (Tr. 
572-76, 663-64.) Regarding the suspense account adjustment in particular, Wasatch's 
Chief Financial Officer testified that Eggett himself ordered the change to a two-year 
accrual period in 1996, a year before Eggett's resignation, to be consistent with the 
industry standard. (Tr. 582-85.) The auditor also testified that "[t]he industry trend was 
two years, and that was a preferable time line." (Tr. 667.) The auditor reaffirmed at trial 
that the audited financial statement accurately stated the book value of the Company, and 
that Eggett's reversal of the income adjustments was inappropriate. (Tr. 669-70.) 
Accordingly, the record contains no evidence of error or deception in the audited financial 
statement, only differences of professional judgment. 
Finally, Eggett purports to set forth the jury calculations in reaching its verdict for 
additional compensation and book value. (Resp. Br. 4.) However, Eggett cites no record 
support for such speculation, and there is none. Contrary to Eggett's assertion, the jury 
did not award him $135,671 as book value of his stock. By a plain reading of the Special 
Verdict, the jury found that amount was "the 'book value' of Wasatch Energy." (Add. 
23, emp. added.) It was Judge Young who then improperly awarded that entire amount to 
Eggett, instead of only the 36.5 percent to which he was alternatively entitled under the 
verdict. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Eggett is bound by the audited book value of his stock, as set forth in the 
Shareholders' Agreement. Even if Eggett's adjustments to audited book value were 
relevant to prove breach of good faith and fair dealing, they could not be used to alter the 
agreed book value of his stock. Alternatively, Eggett is bound by the unambiguous jury 
verdict. Rule 47(r) has no application to this case because the verdict contained no facial 
error or inconsistency. Judge Young erred in altering the verdict question, after it was 
answered, to suit his own view of the evidence. Eggett is precluded from recovering 
attorney fees by his failure to apportion fees between recoverable and nonrecoverable 
claims. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: EGGETT IS BOUND BY THE AUDITED BOOK VALUE OF HIS 
STOCK, AS REQUIRED BY THE SHAREHOLDERS' 
AGREEMENT. 
Wasatch has argued simply and consistently, in three different courts now, that 
Eggett is entitled only to the "book value" of his stock, as established in the Company's 
audited financial statement of June 30, 1997. That is the amount that Eggett agreed 
would be "binding and conclusive upon the parties" when he signed the Shareholders' 
Agreement in 1995 (Add. 46); that is the amount he demanded in his resignation letter of 
April 1997 (Add. 85); and that is the relief he requested in his complaint in September 
1997, citing the Shareholders' Agreement. At trial, Eggett requested 36.5 percent of 
Company book value, albeit a book value inflated by ten times with his own adjustments 
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(Tr. 256; Add. 51), and Eggett approved the Special Verdict Form asking the jury to find 
"the 'book value5 of Wasatch Energy" (Add. 23). Accordingly, this case has consistently 
focused on enforcement of the express contract provision for the book value of Eggett's 
stock. At no time, until now, in this Court, has Eggett claimed separate damages for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.1 
A. The Court of Appeals Missed the Legal Issue of Contract Enforcement 
At trial, Wasatch moved for directed verdict on the contract measure of Eggett's 
book value, arguing that the audited financial statement established Eggett's book value 
as a matter of law, precluding that issue from going to the jury. (Tr. 907, Add. 27.) The 
district court denied the motion, explaining that Eggett is "not going to be specifically 
bound to the audited statement" because of the Company's possible "bias" in preparing 
its financial statement. (Tr. 908, Add. 28.) The court added that "it would be inequitable 
1
 Eggett presents a constantly moving target. Before trial, he demanded only the book value 
of his stock, as established by the audited financial statement. At trial, he sought to inflate 
Company book value with his own adjustments to increase his contract book value. Dissatisfied 
with the jury's finding of Company book value, Eggett, with the aid of the trial judge, obtained a 
judgment for the entire Company book value. When Wasatch demonstrated in the court of 
appeals that Eggett's book value adjustments were impermissible as a matter of law, Eggett 
argued that the adjustments were admissible to prove breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. Now that Wasatch has demonstrated in this Court that Eggett requested no 
separate damages for breach of the implied covenant, making admission of the adjustments for 
that purpose immaterial, he is arguing for the first time that the inflated award of book value is 
really an award of damages for breach of the implied covenant. This Court must put a stop to 
Eggett's slippery changes of position and hold him to the issues framed by his complaint. This 
Court should not address Eggett's new argument that the jury's response to Question 5, finding 
Company book value, is really an award of damages for breach of good faith and fair dealing. 
See Franklin Financial v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983) ("matters not 
presented to the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal"). 
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to require him to simply accept an audited statement" that could be "influenced" by the 
Company. (Tr. 908-09, Add. 28-29, emp. added.) 
In the court of appeals, Wasatch argued again that the book value defined by the 
Shareholders' Agreement and established by the audited financial statement should be 
enforced as a matter of law, precluding Eggett's adjustments to Company book value. 
Conceding the terms of the contract, Eggett then argued for the first time that his 
adjustments were admissible to prove breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. The court of appeals followed that diversion, avoiding the legal issue of 
contract enforcement and holding only that the district judge acted within his discretion to 
admit Eggett's book value adjustments to prove breach of good faith and fair dealing. 
(Slip Op. at Tflj 25-26, Add. 8-9.) Thus, the court of appeals missed and failed to decide 
the legal issue presented. 
B. Eggett Made No Separate Claim of Damages for Breach of Good Faith and 
Fair Dealing. 
Eggett argues at length that contracts contain an implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, that his adjustments to the audited financial statement are admissible to 
prove his claim for breach of this implied covenant, and that the jury's finding of 
Company book value was actually an award of damages for breach of the implied 
covenant. (Resp. Br. 12-19.) Eggett artfully mixes undisputed truth with plain error. 
Utah law recognizes an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in most 
contracts. The purpose of this covenant is to ensure that both parties deal fairly and 
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receive the benefits of the express contract. Breach of the implied covenant gives rise to 
a claim for breach of contract, compensable through contract damages. E.g, St. 
Benedict'sDev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199-200 (Utah 1991). 
However, the measure of damages for breach of the implied covenant is not co-extensive 
with, and indeed may go beyond, the measure of damages for breach of the express 
contract. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah 1996). Therefore, 
courts should "consider these claims separately from the other breach of contract claims." 
St. Benedicts, supra, at 199. In any event, the extent to which this implied covenant 
applies to express employment contracts is open to question. See Berube v. Fashion 
Centre, 111 P.2d 1033, 1049, 1051-52 (Utah 1989) ("Until we have had a better 
opportunity to consider the minimum rights and obligations that inhere in the employment 
relationship,... I would reject invitations to create this cause of action.55) (Zimmerman, 
J., concurring). Moreover, the implied covenant "cannot be construed . . . to establish 
new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties. Nor can a covenant of 
good faith be used to nullify a right granted by a contract to one of the parties or to 
require a party vested with a contract right to exercise that right in a manner contrary to 
that party's legitimate self-interest.55 Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 
1991). 
Accordingly, Wasatch does not dispute that a claim for breach of good faith and 
fair dealing may be available, or that evidence extrinsic to a written contract may be 
admissible to prove breach of that implied covenant. However, Eggett strains credibility 
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by arguing that his adjustments were presented for that purpose in this case. In his 
pretrial motion to compel discovery of the accounting adjustments, Eggett's counsel 
asserted: "This information is necessary to calculate the book value of Eggett's 
shares . . . . " (R. 117.) At trial, in opposing Wasatch's motion in limine to exclude 
Eggett's adjustments to Company book value, Eggett's counsel argued that the 
adjustments were relevant "in establishing book value of [Eggett's] shares" and should be 
"considered in determination of book value." (Tr. 10.) Most importantly, Eggett 
presented his adjustments at trial in the context of his testimony on Company and 
personal book value. (Tr. 255-89, 888-94.) Eggett's own trial exhibit shows that his 
adjustments were intended and used to increase Company book value from the audited 
figure of $75,452 to the fictitious figure of nearly $700,000. (Add. 50-51.) The bottom-
line purpose of his adjustments was to prove his own claimed book value of $255,419, 
shown on his exhibit as 36.5 percent of the adjusted Company book value. (Add. 51.) 
Consistent with this evidence, the Special Verdict form, approved by Eggett, asked the 
jury to find "the 'book value' of Wasatch Energy," from which his 36.5 percent would be 
determined. (Add. 23.) Thus, the jury verdict provided Eggett with the precise benefit of 
the express Shareholders' Agreement, the audited book value of his stock. See St. 
Benedict's, supra. 
Eggett never asserted a separate claim of damages for breach of good faith and fair 
dealing, as required to obtain a separate recovery under that theory. See Billings, supra, 
at 464 (special verdict found that defendant "had breached both the implied covenant... 
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and the express coverage provision"). As shown above, Eggett's testimony and exhibits 
were all directed to calculation of book value, the contract benefit he claimed under the 
express provisions of the Shareholders' Agreement. He presented no testimony or 
exhibits on claimed damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. The jury was instructed only that breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing constitutes a breach of contract. (J.I. No. 27, Tr. 921.) The only 
compensatory damage instruction stated simply that if the jury found "in favor" of Eggett, 
it was to award "such damages" as would fairly compensate for the "damage sustained." 
(J.I. No. 32, Tr. 923.) The only question in the Special Verdict relating to monetary 
compensation for the stock asked the jury for "the 'book value5 of Wasatch Energy as 
defined by the Shareholders Agreement" (Add. 23, emp. added.) No question was asked 
regarding separate or additional damages for breach of good faith and fair dealing. Thus, 
the record provides no support for Eggett's assertions that his adjustments were intended 
to prove breach of good faith and fair dealing, or that the jury awarded damages for that 
claim.2 
Eggett's assertion that his claim for bad faith was presented to the jury in Special 
Verdict Question 3, and that the jury awarded damages for bad faith in Special Verdict 
Question 5 borders on the frivolous. (Resp. Br. 16-17.) Question 3 is the predicate for 
2
 Eggett argues that he asserted a claim for breach of good faith and fair dealing by referring 
to bad faith in his opening and closing arguments. (Resp. Br. 15-16.) However, legal arguments 
of counsel are not, and cannot be considered, evidence, as the jury was properly instructed. (J.I. 
No. 4, Tr. 913.) 
10 
Questions 4 and 5, asking essentially whether Eggett was entitled to the book value of his 
stock. If he was properly terminated for cause, he would receive only "par value," and 
the jury could skip the following questions on book value. By finding that Wasatch 
breached its agreement to pay book value, the jury was required to answer the subsequent 
questions relating to calculation of book value. Question 3 makes no reference to the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; it merely establishes that Eggett was 
entitled to book value instead of par value. Moreover, contrary to Eggett's unsupported 
and outrageous assertion, the parties made no agreement to combine express and implied 
contract claims into a single question. As for Question 5, the plain language asks only for 
"the 'book value5 of Wasatch Energy"; it clearly does not ask for an award of damages 
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the 
Special Verdict, on its face, contains no reference to breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing; it contains no finding of a breach of the implied covenant, and 
neither requests nor awards any damages for such a breach.3 
3
 Apparently conceding his failure to seek recovery for breach of the implied covenant in the 
district court, Eggett argues that Wasatch is precluded from asserting this failure because 
Wasatch did not raise it in the district court to allow Eggett to augment the verdict form. (Resp. 
Br. 18-19.) However, this dizzying argument defies reason. Wasatch did not make this assertion 
in the district court because Eggett did not seek recovery for breach of the implied covenant in 
the district court. Moreover, the burden is on Eggett to request claimed damages in the verdict 
form. Eggett did not claim he was seeking recovery for bad faith until he reached the court of 
appeals and attempted to justify admission of his adjustments to the audited financial statement. 
Not until he reached this Court did Eggett argue that the jury actually awarded him damages for 
bad faith. Accordingly, it is Eggett whose arguments should be barred as raised first on appeal. 
See Franklin Financial, supra. 
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C. A Claim of Bad Faith Cannot Alter the Contract Book Value. 
Even if Eggett 5s adjustments were admissible to prove breach of good faith and 
fair dealing, the court of appeals was still required to enforce the express terms of the 
written Shareholders' Agreement. As this Court made clear in Brehany, supra, the 
implied covenant of good faith cannot be used to establish new rights or to nullify vested 
rights under the written agreement. 812 P.2d at 55. As applied here, Eggett cannot 
invoke the implied covenant to override the definition of "book value" in the 
Shareholders' Agreement. Nor can a claim of bad faith force Wasatch to forego its right 
to enforce the Shareholders' Agreement. If Eggett believed Wasatch acted in bad faith in 
preparing its financial statements, he was free to assert a separate claim for bad faith 
damages, but he chose not to. Even if Eggett had asserted a separate claim for bad faith 
damages, that would not change the amount recoverable for his stock under the express 
agreement; he would still be limited to the audited book value of his stock. 
Accordingly, admissibility of Eggett's income adjustments as an evidentiary 
matter to prove breach of the implied covenant is immaterial to enforcement of the 
defined measure of "book value" under the express contract. They are separate issues. 
Eggett has successfully evaded the legal issue by raising the smokescreen of good faith 
and fair dealing. However, with or without the breach of covenant claim, Wasatch is still 
entitled to enforce the contract definition of "book value." 
Eggett cites no case contrary to this conclusion and fails to distinguish the 
compelling cases cited in Wasatch's opening brief regarding enforcement of stock buy-
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out agreements. (See Pet. Br. 13-16.) Eggett refers to possible exceptions to enforcement 
based on mathematical error, concealment of assets, or deviation from proper accounting 
practices, but Eggett neither alleged nor proved any such exception. The closest Eggett 
can come is to assert that Wasatch prepared the financial statement to its own benefit, 
contrary to his own judgment. However, as the astute businessman who agreed to be 
bound by the audited book value of his stock, Eggett knew that it was the Company that 
would prepare the financial statement for audit, and that the departing shareholder might 
disagree with the value in the audited statement. Presumably, he never considered that he 
would be the departing shareholder. Nonetheless, the contract definition of book value 
must be enforced as written. 
POINT II: ALTERNATIVELY, EGGETT IS BOUND BY THE JURY VERDICT 
ESTABLISHING THE BOOK VALUE OF HIS STOCK. 
This is an unusual case in which the appellant seeks to enforce the jury verdict. In 
reviewing that verdict, this Court must view the record "in the light most supportive of 
the verdict." Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., supra, 918 P.2d at 467. 
Eggett does not directly dispute the authorities and analysis provided by Wasatch 
demonstrating the sanctity and enforceability of jury verdicts. (See Pet. Br. 19-25.) 
Neither does Eggett dispute that Utah R. Civ. P. 47(r) authorizes correction of a verdict 
only if it is "informal or insufficient." (Resp. Br. 21.) Rather, Eggett argues that a trial 
judge has discretion to question a jury to determine if the verdict is informal or 
insufficient even when there is no obvious or patent error on the face of the verdict. In 
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other words, Eggett argues that a trial judge can question jurors to look for possible error 
in their verdict before any error is apparent. (Resp. Br. 21-35.) This position finds no 
support in the language of Rule 47(r) or the cases of this Court construing it. 
A. Utah Case Law Limits Rule 47fr> to Correction of Patent Error or 
Inconsistency. 
Eggett quotes the leading case of Jorgensen v. Gonzales, 383 P.2d 934, 935 (Utah 
1963), which limits Rule 47(r) to situations "where it is apparent that there is some patent 
error in connection with the verdict.5' (Emp. added.) He then argues that the verdict in 
that case "was regular on its face," and that the trial court questioned the jury about 
"possible" error. (Resp. Br. 22.) However, Eggett purposely misreads the case. 
Jorgensen is a personal injury case in which the jury verdict awarded $368.49 special 
damages and $1,131.51 general damages. These "odd amounts" on the face of the 
verdict constituted obvious error because general damages are typically awarded in round 
figures for pain and suffering, not in odd dollars and cents. Because of this odd amount 
of general damages, the court questioned the jury, not in search of possible error, but to 
determine the nature of the obvious error. Specifically, the court questioned the jury 
about a possible quotient verdict and learned, instead, that the jury had included travel 
expenses in general damages, producing the odd amount. The "court directed the jury to 
go out and reconsider its verdict," and the jury returned with a verdict of the same special 
damages and revised general damages of $1,200.00. Id. at 935. This Court affirmed the 
trial court's action, reasoning that "where it is apparent that there is some patent error in 
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connection with the verdict," the trial court may direct the jury to redeliberate. Id. (emp. 
added). Accordingly, given that "some patent error" existed on the face of the verdict, the 
trial court properly questioned the jury, not in search of possible error, but to determine 
the nature of the "patent error." 
Rather than address the merits of other Utah cases cited by Wasatch to support the 
"patent error" standard of Rule 47(r), Eggett cites three Utah cases that do not even cite or 
discuss Rule 47(r). (Resp. Br. 23-24.) Baker v. Cook, 308 P.2d 264 (Utah 1957), actually 
supports Wasatch's position, holding that the appellant waived his claims of confusion or 
ambiguity in the special verdict by failing to object before the jury retired for 
deliberation. Id. at 266-67. In any event, Eggett completely misquotes the case. The 
reference to "adroitly" questioning jurors is actually a quotation of the appellant's 
argument, not the Court's holding. Id. at 266. Rule 47(r) is not mentioned, and the issue 
of patent error is not addressed. Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078 
(Utah 1985), also supports Wasatch's position, holding that a party claiming ambiguity in 
a special verdict must object before the jury is discharged. Id. at 1083. No mention is 
made of Rule 47(r) or of a trial court's searching for error in the absence of obvious error 
on the face of the verdict. Finally, in Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508 (Utah 
App. 1990), the appellant did not challenge the trial court's questioning of the jury 
foreman to resolve patently inconsistent special verdict answers. {Id. at 516.) 
Accordingly, Eggett has failed to refute the basic principle of Rule 47(r) that a trial 
court's questioning of jurors regarding their special verdict is authorized only when the 
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verdict contains some patent or clear error or inconsistency. Eggett has cited no Utah 
case authorizing a trial judge to question jurors regarding a verdict that is clear and 
unambiguous on its face, in search of possible error. The court of appeals decision in this 
case stands alone. As a matter of policy, the rule urged by Eggett and adopted by the 
court of appeals would obliterate the line between the proper roles of judge and jury, 
opening every verdict to the questioning, probing, and altering of the verdict until it 
reached a form that satisfied the judge's view of the evidence or assessment of fairness. 
Such judicial incursion into the province of the jury would thus effectively deny the right 
to a jury trial. See, e.g., EFCO Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin, Ml P.2d 615, 617-18 (Utah 
1966). 
B. Cases From Other Jurisdictions Do Not Support Eggett's Position. 
The California cases cited by Eggett support Wasatch's interpretation of Rule 
47(r). In fact, the leading case of Crowe v. Sacks, 283 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1955), cited in 
Wasatch's opening brief (Pet. Br. 25-26), is very similar to the present case and supports 
reversal of the court of appeals. There, the jury's special verdict awarded combined 
special and general damages of $2,500 to one plaintiff and $3,000 to another. Upon 
reading the special verdict, the trial judge expressed his opinion that the amounts were too 
low because they reflected insufficient compensation for pain and suffering. The judge 
remarked, "I think this verdict is grossly inadequate." Id. at 692. The judge directed the 
jury to redeliberate, and they returned with increased verdicts of $8,500 and $11,000, for 
the two plaintiffs respectively. Id. On appeal, the California Supreme Court construed its 
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rule of procedure that is equivalent to our Rule 47(r), holding that the original verdict was 
neither "informal" nor "insufficient" because it was in proper form and did not exclude 
any essential element of damages. The verdict was not "insufficient" "merely because it 
awarded smaller sums than might seem proper to the trial court." Id. at 693. The proper 
procedure to challenge the amount of the verdict is by motion for new trial. Id. 
Moreover, the trial court's statement that the verdict was inadequate "was a clear invasion 
of the province of the jury to determine the amounts of damages to be awarded." Id. at 
694. The fact that the jury returned with a higher verdict "is a clear indication that the 
jury was thus influenced in reaching its final verdict." Id. The Supreme Court rebuked 
the trial court for "throwing] the weight of his influence into the deliberations of the jury 
as to matters exclusively within its province." Id.A 
The federal cases relied upon by Eggett and the court of .appeals have no 
application here because the federal rules have no equivalent to Utah R. Civ. P. 47(r). In 
any event, the cases are distinguishable and obviously have no binding effect on Utah 
law. In Romano v. U-Haul International, 233 F.3d 655 (1st Cir. 2000), the jury in a sex 
4
 Other California cases cited by Eggett are consistent with Crowe. Eggett misstates the 
holding and relies on dictum in Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding and Equip. Co., 445 P.2d 881 
(Cal. 1968). The court held that "in light of the instructions, the verdict was not ambiguous. 
Accordingly, there was nothing to clarify." Id. at 884. In both Mendoza v. Club Car, Inc., 96 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 605 (Cal. App. 2000), and Mizel v. City of Santa Monica, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 649 
(Cal. App. 2001), the jury returned a special verdict that was inconsistent on its face, finding in 
one question no foreseeable risk, yet in a subsequent question finding liability. In both cases, the 
trial judge neutrally identified the inconsistency, and the jury redeliberated and returned a finding 
of foreseeability, thus eliminating the facial inconsistency. Accordingly, those cases are easily 
distinguished from the present case, in which Judge Young read the facially clear verdict, told 
the jury they made a mistake, and then coerced them into answering his revised, compound 
question without any opportunity of redeliberation. 
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discrimination case returned a verdict with $0 compensatory damages and $15,000 
nominal damages. Concluding that the verdict, on its face, showed mistake or confusion 
concerning the meaning of "nominal damages," the judge reinstructed the jury and 
directed them to reconsider those two questions. The jury returned with a revised verdict 
switching the $15,000 to compensatory damages and the $0 to nominal damages. The 
appellate court found no abuse of discretion in allowing the jury to correct its obvious 
mistake. Id. at 670-72. See also Unit Drilling Co. v. Enron Oil & Gas Co., 108 F.3d 
1186 (10th Cir. 1997) (authorizing trial judge to question jury regarding ambiguous 
verdict to determine whether damage award included claimed set-off amount); Resolution 
Trust Corp. v. Stone, 998 F.2d 1534 (10th Cir. 1993) (authorizing trial judge to question 
jury regarding ambiguous verdict to determine whether damage figures on different 
statutory counts should be aggregated). Thus, all three cases involved apparent mistake 
or ambiguity on the face of the verdict. 
Accordingly, the cases cited by Eggett from other state and federal jurisdictions do 
not support the actions by Judge Young, under Utah law, in this case. Three points are 
relevant. First, it must be noted that Eggett resorts to these outside cases because there is 
no support for his position under Utah law. Second, all the cases that uphold the trial 
court's questioning of a jury verdict involve verdicts that contain some patent or facial 
error or ambiguity. Eggett attempts to make a legal distinction between "patent error" 
and "ambiguity," arguing that the federal cases support the lower ambiguity standard. 
However, the real point is that no case authorizes judicial intervention when the verdict 
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contains no facial problem, whether phrased as error, mistake, ambiguity, defect, 
inconsistency, or confusion. See, e.g., Chicago Rock Island & Pac. R.R. v. Speth, 404 
F.2d 291, 295-96 (8th Cir. 1968) (disapproving trial court's questioning of clear verdict 
based only on judge's concern for the size of the verdict). Regardless of whether the 
standard is phrased as "error" or "ambiguity," the verdict in the present case contained 
neither, on its face. Third, regarding the standard of review, a trial court's discretion to 
question a verdict arises only after it is shown to contain some patent or obvious error or 
inconsistency. A court's response to that problem is properly reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. See, e.g., Romano v. U-Haul, supra, at 671; Mendoza v. Club Car, supra, at 
613-14. However, a trial court has no discretion to question or revise a verdict that is 
clear on its face; such improper intervention is reviewed for correction of error. See, e.g., 
Langton v. International Transport, Inc., 491 P.2d 1211, 1215 (Utah 1971) ("verdict 
regular on its face" can be challenged only by motion for new trial); EFCO Distributing, 
Inc. v. Perrin, supra, at 618 ("court should not upset a verdict merely because it may 
disagree"); First Security Bank v. Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc., 454 P.2d 886, 889 (Utah 1969) 
("it is not the trial court's prerogative to make findings inconsistent" with the jury's 
verdict).5 
5
 Eggett also argues, hypothetically, that if Judge Young could have received post-trial juror 
affidavits to revise the verdict, then he could properly question jurors before discharge for the 
same purpose. (Resp. Br. 32-35.) However, Eggett's premise is erroneous. Under Utah R. Evid. 
606(b), "a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the 
jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions 
as influencing the .. . verdict... or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection 
therewith," except for "extraneous prejudicial information" or improper "outside influence." 
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C. The Court of Appeals Erred In Allowing Revision of the Verdict 
Eggett argues that a trial judge has discretion to question the jury regarding its 
verdict to ensure that its "true verdict" was entered. In fact, asserts Eggett, the jury's 
verdict is not the verdict at all until the judge reviews it and approves it. (Resp. Br. 35-
36.) This view of unlimited judicial discretion is, of course, contrary to the very essence 
of Rule 47(r) and the cases decided thereunder. Rule 47(r) imposes a proper separation 
between the judge and the jury, restricting the judge from questioning the jury's verdict 
unless the verdict contains error or inconsistency on its face. Otherwise, the judge could 
question every verdict to determine whether the jury really meant what it said: "Did you 
really intend to find for the plaintiff?" "Did you really intend to award so much in 
damages?" "Are you sure you awarded sufficient damages?" "Do you really believe this 
defendant is innocent?" "How did you reach that verdict?" Because of the judge's high 
and trusted position, such questions would naturally cause the jury to doubt the 
correctness of its verdict. Through such questioning, a judge could easily lead the jury to 
a different result, as Judge Young did in the present case. Such unjustified questioning 
(Emp. added.) See Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah 1983) (all that was said or done 
in the jury room, including evidence of jury confusion or misunderstanding of facts or law, is 
inadmissible); State v. Gee, 498 P.2d 662, 665 (Utah 1972) (law excludes evidence of jury 
misunderstandings, "opinions, surmises and processes of reasoning in arriving at a verdict"); 
Cooper v. Evans, 262 P.2d 278, 280-81 (Utah 1953) (juror disappointment or misunderstanding 
as to legal effect of verdict does not affect validity of verdict; jury's "function was but to make 
the finding of fact"). The case of Brown v. Johnson, All P.2d 942 (Utah 1970), cited by Eggett, 
actually confirms the proper scope of Rule 47(r)5 allowing correction of "obvious error." Id. at 
945. Dictum therein regarding use of juror affidavits has been superseded by Utah R. Evid. 
606(b). Again, Eggett's discussion of federal authorities on the subject is neither relevant nor 
persuasive. 
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would lead to untold mischief, subtle coercion to change the verdict, and blatant judicial 
participation in the exclusive jury function. Contrary to Eggett's assertion, the verdict as 
"pronounced in court by the jurors, must be taken as the sole embodiment of the jury's 
a c t . . . , irrespective of what led up to it in the privacy of the jury room." State v. Gee, 
supra, at 666 n.14. See also Chicago Rock Island & Pac. R. R., supra, at 296 (dangers of 
allowing court to question plain verdict). Thus, as set forth above, the trial judge has no 
discretion to question a verdict unless it contains manifest error or inconsistency. The 
court of appeals erred in according such discretion in this case. (Slip Op. at f^ 40.) 
The real issue here, then, is whether the jury's verdict contained manifest error to 
justify Judge Young's interrogation of jurors and revision of the verdict question. As 
demonstrated in Wasatch's opening brief (Pet. Br. 8-9, 27-28), Question 5 plainly asked 
for "the 'book value' of Wasatch Energy"; it did not ask for Eggett's book value. The 
question asked for Company book value because that had been the starting point for 
calculation of Eggett's book value throughout the trial. When Eggett was asked how to 
determine his book value, he testified: "[Y]ou take the equity [book value] of the 
company and you multiply it by my ownership interest, which was 36.5%, so we have to 
determine the amount of ownership equity that was in the company'' (Tr. 256, emp. 
added.) Both parties used the audited financial statement to determine Company book 
value. (Add. 56.) Eggett's own trial exhibit showed total Company equity, multiplied by 
his 36.5 percent, to reach his claimed book value of $255,419. (Add. 51.) Accordingly, 
the parties naturally framed the question on the Special Verdict Form to ask for the book 
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value of the Company, Wasatch Energy, from which Eggett's percentage would be 
derived. (Add. 23.) Neither Eggett nor Judge Young raised any objection or question 
regarding Question 5 as it was read and presented to the jury. (Tr. 925-29.) Accordingly, 
the question was clear on its face, and Judge Young had no business declaring, after the 
jury had answered it, that the question was "confusing" and a "mistake." (Tr. 990.) The 
court of appeals had no basis to find "patent error" in the verdict. (Slip Op. at f^ 35.)6 
Neither does the jury's answer to Question 5 show patent error. The jury simply 
filled in the blank with a single number: "$135,671.96." (Add. 23.) Contrary to Eggett's 
argument (Resp. Br. 25), this answer was not "insufficient" because it directly and 
completely responded to the question asked. Moreover, because this number fell between 
Wasatch's total book value of $75,452 (Add. 56) and Eggett's adjusted Company book 
value of $699,778 (Add. 51), it presented no obvious error. Eggett's counsel made no 
objection to the verdict as rendered. Judge Young simply revised the question, sua 
sponte, because, as he said, "I don't know how they would have come up with the book 
value of that company at 135." (Tr. 995.) In other words, the verdict was not consistent 
with his assessment of the evidence, an assessment he is prohibited by law from making, 
absent a motion for new trial.7 
6
 Eggett now argues that he really intended for the jury to do the math and find the amount of 
his personal book value. (Resp. Br. 39.) However, that is not the question he approved for the 
Special Verdict Form, and he has now waived any objection to the question that was plainly 
asked. 
7
 Eggett also argues that the jury foreman's response to Judge Young's questions manifested 
jury confusion as to whether they had found the Company's book value or Eggett's book value. 
Eggett asserts that Judge Young was obligated to clear-up that confusion. (Resp. Br. 25, 41-46.) 
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Finally, Eggett argues that any error by Judge Young in questioning jurors and 
revising the verdict was "harmless." (Resp. Br. 46-47.) However, the clear result of 
Judge Young's actions was to increase Eggett's book value under the verdict from 36.5 
percent of $135,671 ($49,520) to the foil $135,671. "The higher verdict reached," under 
questioning from the trial court, "is a clear indication that the jury was thus influenced in 
reaching its final verdict." Crowe v. Sacks, supra, 283 P.2d at 694. Again, there is no 
evidence in the record to establish the jury's "true intent" or how it actually derived its 
verdict finding of $135,671. Accordingly, the record is clear that the verdict and 
judgment would have been significantly different in the absence of the trial court's errors. 
POINT III: EGGETT FAILED TO APPORTION ATTORNEY FEES BETWEEN 
RECOVERABLE AND NONRECOVERABLE CLAIMS. 
Eggett does not dispute the authorities cited by Wasatch showing that he is legally 
required to apportion his claimed fees between recoverable and nonrecoverable claims; 
that is, between the stock and compensation claims. {See Pet. Br. 30-31.) Rather, Eggett 
claims that he satisfied this apportionment requirement by segregating his fees by date, 
excluding only the $1,300 in fees incurred for the three weeks prior to May 16, 1997, four 
months before the complaint was even filed. (Resp. Br. 47-49.) However, this token 
However, this argument leaps right over the threshold of Rule 47(r), which prohibits Judge 
Young from asking even the first question. By that point, he had already crossed the line and 
exceeded his proper authority. Absent that first question, there was no indication of any 
ambiguity or confusion. Any confusion thereafter was created by Judge Young's own improper 
questioning. Even then, Judge Young's proper course would have been to retreat to a neutral 
position and send the jury back for private redeliberation, instead of completely revising the 
verdict question himself and coercing the jurors in open court to answer in accordance with his 
view of the evidence. See, e.g., Jorgensen, supra, at 383 P.2d at 935-36; Brown, supra, All P.2d 
at 945. 
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exclusion by date plainly does not meet the requirement for apportionment by type of 
claim. Eggett makes no attempt to apportion fees between the stock claim, for which fees 
are recoverable, and the compensation claim, for which they are not recoverable. 
Therefore, the court of appeals erred in approving the fee award. E.g., Valcarce v. 
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah 1998).8 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals, enter judgment for Eggett in the amount of the Contract Book Value of his stock 
($27,540), vacate the award of attorney fees for lack of apportionment, and award 
Wasatch attorney fees on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 3 day of April, 2002. 
KIRTON&McCONKIE 
Bv: ^ ^ l ^ y > ^ ? ^i^A^^ 
Eric C. Olson 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendant/Petitioner 
8
 The two claims are not "inextricably intertwined" because the compensation claim was 
limited to the terms of the compensation agreement, while the stock claim focused on grounds 
for Eggett's termination and the value of stock under the Shareholders' Agreement. Wasatch's 
counterclaims are also apportionable between the same two general issues: 1) what was Eggett 
owed under the compensation agreement; and 2) what was Eggett owed under the Shareholders' 
Agreement. The district court's Supplemental Judgment is hopelessly inconsistent, finding first 
that "Eggett has made a proper and reasonable segregation" between claims, and then finding in 
the next sentence that "it is not possible to segregate" them. (Add. 20.) Some reasonable attempt 
at apportionment was both possible and legally required. 
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